Abstract-Nash equilibrium is usually used as the solution of generator's strategic bidding in electricity markets. The available literatures have demonstrated by simulation that multiple market equilibria or no pure equilibrium may be induced with the inclusion of network constraints (e.g. transmission constraints). This paper presents a systematical analysis of the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium in oligopolistic electricity markets. In our modeling, the ISO dispatches generation and determines nodal prices via solving an OPF problem; and the individual generator optimizes its supply function with Nash-Cournot strategy, after taking into account of the ISO's decision making process on dispatched generation and nodal prices. The conditions for the existence of equilibrium are given, and it is shown that there may be multiple equilibria; and the equilibrium, if exists, will be at a point where generators pay no congestion charge.
I. INTRODUCTION
N recent years, competitions have been introduced to power industry in order to increase social welfare and to improve the market efficiency. Usually there is a spot market (dayahead market) for short-term electrical power transaction. In the sport market, market participants (generators and consumers) submit their next-day hourly generation or demand bids to an ISO (Independent System Operator). With these submitted bids, the ISO clears the market to schedule generation and determine the MCP (market clearing price) [1] . For the current electricity markets are more akin to oligopoly, the individual market participant has market power and thereby can influence the MCP by its strategic bidding. Several papers have presented the empirical evidence for this issue [2] [3] .
Roughly speaking, there are two important research issues related to the strategic bidding in electricity markets.
The first one is the study on how to build an optimal bidding strategy for a generator. Usually, the problem of building the optimal bidding strategy for a generator is to optimize its bid, based on its own production cost, and its expectation about the others as well as the market information. With the consideration of uncertainties of the system demand and uncertainties of rival bids, the strategic bidding can be
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formulated as a problem of maximizing the expected profit, which can be solved via various probabilistic/stochastic optimization methods, such as Markov decision processdiscrete dynamic programming [4] , Ordinal optimization [5] , Stochastic optimization with a genetic algorithm and Monte Carlo simulation [6] , Lagrangian relaxation and stochastic dynamic programming [7] .
On the other hand, the optimal bidding strategy can be obtained via indirect methods, such as MCP-prediction based methods and heuristic methods. MCP-prediction based methods provide the bidding strategy for a price-taking generator. Usually, a price-taking generator first develops the method to forecast MCPs, and with these forecasted MCPs, it finds its optimal generation through self-unit scheduling. Many MCP prediction techniques are developed, such as ARIMA Model [8] , Cascaded Neural Network [9] , Artificial Intelligence [10] . Meanwhile, heuristic methods are proposed to develop the optimal bidding strategy via market learning, such as Genetic Algorithm evolution [11] , and Actor-Critic learning algorithm [12] .
Another important issue related to the strategic bidding is the analysis of the market equilibrium, or the 'steady' state of the generator's strategic behavior. Game-theory based methods are widely used to model generators' strategic interactions and to search the Nash market equilibrium. In [13] , a Nash game-theory method is adopted to model and analyze the transactions in a Pool-Co market in a continuous strategy space with complete information. Paper [14] studies the impacts of potential coalitions on generators' bidding strategies by the implementation of bids sensitivities. In [15] and [16] , the supply function equilibrium model is used to find the equilibrium by solving a set of coupled nonlinear equations. Paper [17] uses a three-step methodology to find multi-period Nash equilibria, where an iterative simulation process is run to detect the market participants' bidding strategy and the output data from simulator is then analyzed to pick out the Nash equilibria.
It is well-known that network constraints (such as transmission capacity limits) play important roles for the system operation. Network constraints will induce the market separation, where some generator will be more likely to exploit these constraints and exercise its market power. The study on the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium is thus necessary and useful for the efficient operation of an electricity market. To our knowledge, most of the above reported works have ignored network constraints or just included them as a part of generators' bidding process, there is yet no effort to give a fully analytic study about the impacts of network constrains on the market equilibrium. this issue by their simulations. In [18] , it is found by simulation that in a simple two-bus system, pure strategy equilibrium is eliminated by the inclusion of network constraint. Furthermore, the authors simulate the same simple two-bus system and finds that there exists a continuum of Nash equilibria when both consumer bidding and line constraint are considered [19] . In [20] , in order to study the congestion influence on bidding strategies, the authors use a separate curtailment algorithm for congestion management and model the generator's bidding as a three level optimization problem. It is demonstrated by simulation that in a three-node system, the network constraint will cause no pure Nash equilibrium. Similar simulation results can be found in [21] . Also in [22] , a systematic procedure is developed for finding multiple-equlibria in a complicated system with network constraints, where an algorithm is developed to select the efficient regions for searching possible equilibria. Given the above background, this paper presents a rather complete analysis of the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium in oligopolistic electricity markets. The generator bidding is modeled as a two-level optimization problem. In the lower level, the ISO dispatches generation and determines nodal prices via solving an OPF; while in the upper level, the individual generator optimizes its submitted linear supply function with Nash-Cournot strategy, after taking account of the ISO's decision making process on dispatched generation and nodal prices. In our analysis, the decision space of all generators is divided into different subregions. Within each sub-region, the considered network constraint is either strictly binding or strictly slack. The Nash equilibrium is then located as the intersection of generators' optimal response curves within each region or on the boundary between these regions. A typical three-node electricity system is used for investigation. It is shown that with the inclusion of a 'tight' network constraint, there may be a continuum of equilibria; and the market equilibrium, if exists, can only be found on the constraint boundary, which implies that there is no nodal price difference or no congestion charge.
This paper is arranged as follows. In section II, the generator bidding in electricity markets is formulated as a two-level optimization problem. In section III, it is shown that in a typical three-node network-constrained system, there is a continuum of equilibria, and in equilibrium there is no nodal prices difference (no congestion charge). Numerical test results are presented in section VI with conclusions drawn in section V.
II. MODELING GENERATOR BIDDING AS A TWO-LEVEL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM

A. Basic assumptions
Usually, electricity demand can be described by some convex function of electricity price. Here a linear inverse demand function is used, given as:
where p is the market price; D is the system demand; n is the number of generators; e and f are positive coefficients (fixed here). Usually as electrical power can not be stored (at least in large amount), the system supply and demand should be in instantaneous balance, i.e.
For short-term generation scheduling, mainly the variable production cost is considered. Basically the variable cost of power generation is the fuel cost, and such production cost will take a quadratic form, given as:
where ( i a , i b , i c ): non-negative coefficients . Most of electricity markets require that generators submit their supply functions to the ISO. Given the above cost function (2), the submitted supply function can take a linear form, given as: [16] , it is shown that for optimality, i b′ should be equal to the true cost parameter i b .Therefore, in this paper, i b′ is replaced with the true cost parameter i b . That is, generator i takes its supply function slope i x as the only decision variable for achieving the maximum profits.
B. A two-level optimization problem
Similarly as in [18] , the strategic bidding is modeled as a two-level optimization problem. In the lower level, the ISO solves an OPF (Optimal Power Flow) with the aim of maximizing the social welfare, based on submitted bids, i.e.: 
where ( ) 1 2 , , , , 0
gives the network constraint (e.g. 
here. While in the upper level, generator i optimizes its supply function slope with Nash-Cournot strategy, taking into account of the dispatched generation and nodal price determined in the lower level by the ISO, i.e.:
Solving the problem (5), this yields generator i 's optimal decision variable i x , which is dependent on others' decision variables j x ( i j ≠ ), given as:
The function given by equation (6) is also known as optimal response function which describes generator's optimal response curve.
For the above two-level optimization problem, the interaction between the ISO and individual generator can be shown in the following Figure 1 . 
C. Concept of equilibrium
The meaning of Nash equilibrium is that no one can get extra profit by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium, i.e.: Because the definition of Nash equilibrium (7) is satisfied at the intersection point of optimal response curves (6), the market Nash equilibrium is thus given by the intersection of optimal response curves (6), i.e.
( )
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III. A CONTINUUM OF EQUILIBRIA
To focus on how network constraints influences the market equilibrium, the minimum and maximum generation constrains are neglected at this study. That is, constraints
) are eliminated in the OPF problem (4). A typical network-constrained three node system is used for investigation. The studied three-node system is shown in Figure 2 , i.e. there are two generating nodes and one demand node. It is assumed that there is the transmission limit on the link from node 1 to node 3.
With a DC formulation, the network constraint can be modeled as (the demand side node is taken as the reference node): , the system is congested. Nevertheless the market equilibrium is still located as the intersection of optimal response curves within these regions or on the boundary between these regions.
Optimal response curve in congestion-off region
1 Φ First, the situation with no network constraints is studied. Thus, in the OPF problem (4), the constraint ( ) 1 2 , , , , 0
, (4) and (5), generator i 's profit function is derived and its first-order derivation w.r.t. its decision variable i x can also be obtained , given as: ( ) 
The detailed derivation of above formulations can be found in [24] . In [24] , it is showed that the coupled equation system (10) has the unique solution ( ) ,*
,* 1 1 , x x , as shown in Figure 3 .
In Figure 3 , these vertical arrows show the moving trajectory of generator 1's decision variable 1 x , meanwhile these horizontal arrows show the moving trajectory of generator 2's decision variable 2 x . It is not surprising that all of them move towards their respective optimal response curve. 
On the boundary, optimal response functions are also defined, given as: 
When there is the transmission limit on the link from node 1 to node 3, both 1 β and 2 β are positive. The whole decision space Φ is then divided into two regions by the boundary curve (12) , which is shown in Figure 4 . Note that optimal response curves (10) 1 , x x ( 1 Φ ∈ ) is the equilibrium. If so, it is said that the network constraint is too slack, and has no influence on the market equilibrium. In this paper, we focus on the impacts of network constraints on the market equilibrium. Thus it is assumed that the considered network constraint is 'tight', and optimal response curves (given by (10)) have no intersection within region 1 Φ , i.e. the unique solution of (10) is located in region
), as shown in Figure 5 . These dashed lines represent the invalid unconstrained optimal response curves as they are located in incompatible region (here the congestion-on region). The valid optimal responses in the congestion-off region are then shown in Figure 6 . 
With the help of Lagrangian multipliers to associate the constraints into the objective function, the above OPF problem can be formulated as a Lagrangian function, given as:
where the Lagrangian multiplier µ gives the shadow price of network constraint, and the Lagrangian multiplier λ gives the marginal cost for market balancing. For the above system, λ is also the market price in the demand side. Solving the problem (15), this yields individual scheduled generation: ( ) The first-order derivative of generator's profit function w.r.t. its decision variable is given as: 2  2  1  2  1 2  2 1  2  1  1  2  1  2  2   2  2  2  1  2  1 2  1 2  2  2  2  1  2  2 It is very easy to check that these optimal response curves within the region Integrating Figure 6 and Figure 8 , the complete optimal response curves in the whole decision space are obtained, as shown in Figure 9 .
Note that in Figure 9 , generator 1's response curve ( ) Φ by a section of boundary curve. That is, generator 1's optimal response is actually located on the boundary in some region, i.e. given by equation (13) . This fact can also be told from the moving trajectory of generator 1's decision variable 1 x . Similar conclusion can be drawn for generator 2. Figure 9 , it is to see that there is a section of boundary curve which attracts all the movements of 1 x and 2 x . Thus it is concluded that there is a continuum of equilibria on the boundary, which is shown in the above figure with black solid line. Also in equilibrium, there is no congestion charge (for on the boundary between congestion-on region and congestionoff region, shadow price µ is zero). The intuition that the system congestion charge can be preempted by generator's strategic bidding, has been pointed out by S. Oren in [23] .
On the other hand, when there is the network constraint on the link between node 2 and node 3, obviously it is a symmetrical situation with the previous case, and it is thus expected that the similar results can be obtained.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To validate the above analytical conclusions, numerical results in a three node system (shown in Figure 2 ) are given in this section.
The system inverse demand function is given as: . A numerical technique is used to obtain the optimal response curve. For example, given a 2 x in each step, 1 x is varied in its decision range to find the corresponding 1 x which gives generator 1 the maximum profits. Repeating the above calculation step by step, this yields generator 1's optimal response curve. Similarly, generator 2's optimal response curve can be obtained. Finally, generators' optimal response curves are shown in the following figure.
As analyzed in Section III, there is a continuum of equilibria, which are given as the intersections of these two optimal response curves. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a systematic analysis about the impacts of network constraints (transmission constraints) on the electricity market equilibrium. In our investigation, the generator bidding is modeled as a two-level optimization problem. In the lower level, the ISO dispatches generation and determines nodal prices via solving an OPF. While, in the upper level, the individual generator adopts Nash-Cournot strategy and bids a linear supply function to maximize its profit after taking into account of the ISO's decision making process on the dispatched generation and nodal prices. With the inclusion of network constraint, the whole decision space of generators is divided into different sub-regions. In each region the considered constraint is either strictly binding or strictly slack, and the constraint will be just binding on the boundary between these regions. The market Nash equilibrium is then located as the intersection of these optimal response curves within each region or on the regions' boundaries. It is shown that in a typical network-constrained three node system, there may be a continuum of equilibria; and the equilibrium, if exists, can only be found on the constraint boundary which implies that there is no nodal price difference or no congestion charge.
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